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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over seventy-five years ago, Aldous Huxley envisioned a future in which the 
creation of human individuals is not left to chance and sweaty biology, but is a feat 
of engineering individuals to established specifications.2  Huxley described a process 
                                                                 
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 8.  Macbeth describes the prophecy by 
which he cannot be killed by any man “of woman born.”  Macduff thwarts the prophecy, 
exclaiming that he was “from his mother’s womb, untimely ripp’d,” i.e., born by Caesarian 
section, the earliest precursor to the concept of ectogenesis.  
+Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, ‘10.  There are several people without whom this 
paper would not have happened: David Stein, for last minute brilliance.  Kathryn Kramer, 
without whom this would be a disorganized rant on a paper napkin.  Ben Chojnacki & the rest 
of the 2009-2010 Journal Editorial Board.  And always, my parents, Stuart & Mindi Steiger. 
2ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 1 (Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2006) 
(1932), available at http://www.huxley.net/bnw/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2008). 
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by which human ova are fertilized in-vitro, then “budded” through an imaginary 
technique into multiple copies, and finally grown into identical twins in incubators, 
entirely absent of a mother’s womb.3  While many of Huxley’s predictions about the 
future have come to pass, such as helicopters, the assembly line, and indeed, in-vitro 
fertilization, the prospect of ectogenesis, of gestating a child completely outside of 
its mother’s uterus, is still within the realm of science fiction.4  However, that may 
not be the case for much longer. 
Scientists predict that safe, reliable, and complete ectogenesis will be available 
within the next thirty years, and perhaps within as little as ten or five.5  Researchers 
have already achieved great strides towards this goal, developing a microfluidic chip 
that mimics the biological process of fertilization, making in-vitro fertilization more 
successful,6 and successfully keeping fetal goats alive for weeks using an artificial 
placenta.7  While it is unquestionably a matter of years before the technology exists 
to gestate complete human beings ectogenetically, the legal questions surrounding 
such a process are complex enough to require consideration sooner, rather than later.   
One of the most interesting legal questions presented by the advent of 
ectogenesis is that of “personhood.”  Under the United States Constitution, citizens 
are defined by having been “born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof.”8  A child of ectogenesis, having never been carried in a 
uterus, would never be born in the traditional sense.9  Huxley’s term “decanting” 
seems more appropriate.10  While statutory modification should never be undertaken 
lightly, it appears that simple (by federal standards) legislation could close this 
particular loophole when the time comes to recognize fully mature ectogenetic 
infants as having been “born.” 
                                                                 
3 Id.  
4 For a partial list of examples of ectogenesis in science fiction, see http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).  While many examples also 
include parthenogenesis (female reproduction without male fertilization), cloning 
(reproduction of an individual genetically identical to the parent), genetic engineering 
(modifying the genetic structure of an organism), and other possible future developments in 
reproductive science, this note will be limited to the topic of gestating otherwise-normal 
human fetuses outside the natural womb. 
5 Jeremy Laurance, The Future of Fertility, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 17, 2008.   
6 New Medical Findings Reported by University of Tokyo Researchers, LIFE SCIENCE 
WEEKLY, Sep. 11, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 17436188. 
7 Sakata, Hisano, et. al., A new artificial placenta with a centrifugal pump, 46 THORACIC 
AND CARDIOVASCULAR SURGEON 1023 (1998).  See also Sacha Zimmerman, Technology’s 
Threat to Abortion Rights, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 24, 2003 at D3; Scott Gelfand, Are We Ready 
for an Artificial Womb?, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 3, 2002.   
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
9 “Birth: The complete extrusion of a newborn baby from the mother's body.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).   
10 HUXLEY, supra note 2, at 5.  
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However, far more nuanced questions are raised by a fetus’s status prior to 
decanting.11  The United States Supreme Court has expressly declined to consider 
fetuses as people, denying them protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.12  
Traditionally, a fetus’s protection, especially that of one not developed enough to be 
viable outside the womb, has been inextricably entwined with that of its mother.13  In 
recent years, however, fetuses, and even embryos, have been granted certain 
independent protections, such as restrictions on abortions, and in some cases going 
so far as to be statutorily defined as people between in-vitro fertilization and 
implantation.14 
Functional ectogenesis will require a reexamination of the status of developing 
embryos and fetuses in several important ways: medically, ethically, socially, and 
legally.15  Paramount to this consideration is the development of a fetus into 
“personhood,” such that it gains protections under the law.16  Under the current law, 
                                                                 
11 Under current scientific nomenclature, a fetus is the appropriate term for an immature 
human at any stage of development between eight weeks from fertilization and birth.  While 
the development of an embryo into a fetus is a continuous process taking place over the first 
eight weeks of gestation, for the purposes of the law and this paper it is necessary to 
distinguish between the two concepts.  While an “embryo” technically refers only to a zygote 
between two and eight weeks of development, the term has been extended to include any 
fertilized egg prior to the fetal stage, including those frozen and awaiting implantation.  For 
the sake of simplicity and consistency, this Article will refer to all pre-fetal entities as 
embryos.  
12 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
13 See Keeler v. Super. Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 619 (1970) (holding that a fetus was not a “human 
being” as contemplated by the California statute defining murder at the time, despite a 96% 
chance of viability outside the womb). 
14 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121-133 (2008) (defining in-vitro fertilized human 
embryos as “juridical persons,” and restricting their use solely to preparation for implantation 
in-utero).  To date, Louisiana is the only state that has extended juridical personhood to 
embryos, and it is largely unclear what effect this categorization may have on the abortion 
debate or on future ectogenetic developments.  For a complete description of the statute and its 
development, see Jeanne Louise Carriere, From Status to Person in Book 1, Title 1 of the Civil 
Code, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1263-86 (1999). 
15 The legal, social, ethical, and philosophical questions brought on by ectogenetic 
technology far outstrip the ability of any one article to adequately address them.  In 1923, the 
technology of ectogenesis was lauded as one of the most important biological discoveries 
mankind could make, alongside the domestications of animals, plants, and yeasts and the (at 
the time) future development of bactericides.  J.B.S. HALDANE, DAEDALUS REVISITED 23-50 
(Krishna R. Dronamraju ed., Oxford University Press 1994) (1923).  The social implications 
alone surrounding the possibility of eliminating pregnancy are staggeringly far-reaching and 
complex, and numerous works have attempted to address them in myriad ways.  The legal 
questions encompass areas of biomedical ethics, parental rights, genetic engineering and DNA 
rights, and privacy, to name but a few.  In spite of the breadth of subjects upon which 
ectogenesis potentially has an impact, this paper will be limited to the still-massive questions 
of how ectogenesis affects the point at which a fetus becomes a person for the purposes of 
legal protection and what status it has before then.   
16 See, generally Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for 
Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (2007) [hereinafter Berg, Elephants and Embryos].  
Berg explores the qualifications and ramifications of legal personhood for several different 
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a fetus is considered a person once it becomes viable outside the womb, subject to 
certain exceptions.17  However, the fundamental point of ectogenesis is that it renders 
a fetus “viable,” albeit with technological assistance, from the moment of 
fertilization.18  As such, the legal definition of viability will need to be adapted to 
conform with ectogenetic technology.19  Ironically, the only sensible way to define 
viability without dismantling the current rights to abortion is by returning to the 
bright-line standard of development established in Roe v. Wade.20  While the rigid 
trimester system of Roe has been overturned,21 Congress must, with the help of the 
medical profession, establish a point during fetal development at which the fetus is 
considered “viable,” and thus protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Furthermore, while a pre-viable fetus in utero is not considered a person, it does 
carry protection, both in the form of fetal protection statutes and by virtue of the 
protection granted to the mother.22  In order to maintain equality between a pre-
viable ectogenetic fetus and one carried in the womb, legal protections must be 
                                                          
types of entities, including embryos, fetuses, animals, and artificial intelligences.  Berg argues 
that natural personhood designations are extremely limited, and juridical personhood options 
should be explored as a function of a being’s interest in having legal protection.  Id. at 406.  
One of the points Berg argues most relevant here is the introduction of degrees of personhood.  
“[N]ot all juridical persons will necessarily have the same legal rights.  The rationale for 
restricting juridical persons’ rights based on the justification for granting them arises from the 
impact on existing persons’ rights.” Id. at 380.  Establishing degrees of personhood to a fetus 
over the course of its development is consistent with modern decisions regarding abortion.  
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), upholding a restriction on certain abortions of 
previable fetuses. 
17 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992), reaffirming 
viability as the threshold point for abortion, before which the State’s interests in preserving 
fetal life do not justify a prohibition on abortion.  But see Carhart, 550 U.S. at 171, upholding 
the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban, 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2000), despite the lack of 
distinction in the statute between previability & postviability.  Carhart “blurs the line, firmly 
drawn in Casey, between previability and postviability abortions.”  Id. at 171.  Carhart 
stretches the definition of viable by noting that “a fetus is a living organism while within the 
womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.”  Id. at 186.  “Instead of drawing the line 
at viability, the Court refers to Congress' purpose to differentiate "abortion and infanticide" 
based not on whether a fetus can survive outside the womb, but on where a fetus is 
anatomically located when a particular medical procedure is performed.” Id. 
18 Hyun Jee Son, Artificial Wombs, Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Reconciling 
Viability’s Doctrinal Ambiguity, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 213 (2005).  Son uses ectogenesis to 
explore the vulnerabilities in the viability standard arising from the ambiguity of the term 
“viable.”  Id. at 215.  
19 Id. 
20 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
21 Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
22 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01-2903.08 (2008) (extending Ohio homicide laws 
to include “causing the unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy”).  Fetal homicide is 
specifically defined as to include the entire period between fertilization and birth, and to 
exclude lawful abortions and accident on the part of the pregnant woman herself.  OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2903.09 (2008). 
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established to safeguard a developing ectogenetic baby.23  These protections must 
accurately derive from existing fetal development law, and account for both the 
state’s interest in protecting nascent life, and the parents’ interests in maintaining 
control over their potential offspring.24  In establishing these protections, it becomes 
necessary to determine exactly what legal status a pre-viable developing fetus 
actually has: while the Roe Court has ruled that it cannot be a person,25 courts and 
legislatures have granted and upheld rights and protections for a developing fetus far 
beyond those normally extended to personal property.26 If a fetus in utero is “quasi-
property,” somewhere between a person and a chattel, it is important to know exactly 
what rights and protections are to be applied to it, and why, so that similar rights and 
protections can be applied to a fetus developing ectogenetically.27   
This note will provide an overview of the concept of ectogenesis, the current 
state of the science and law involved, and some broad predictions about the need for 
change in the law to accommodate scientific developments in the near future.  Part II 
will explore the origins of ectogenesis in literature and examine the current state of 
the debate, as well as the current state of medical progress towards a working 
artificial womb.  It will also examine some of the reasons for and against ectogenetic 
development.  Part III will examine the current law regarding fetal status and legal 
personhood before birth.  Part IV will apply the law as it is currently situated to a 
future in which ectogenesis is commonplace, and examine the problems that arise as 
a result.  Part V will propose changes in the law to accommodate for such a future.  
Part VI will address potential problems that may occur as a result of those changes, 
and suggest possible solutions to those problems.  
II.  HISTORICAL AND MEDICAL BACKGROUND 
Ectogenesis is the complete development of a mammalian fetus in an artificial 
uterus.28 This process is thought to still be decades away from fruition, but 
breakthroughs in medical and neonatal technology are bringing it closer to a reality.29  
Reproductive therapy is one of the most lucrative forms of medical practice, and 
                                                                 
23 Berg, Elephants and Embryos, supra note 16 at 398.   
In utero fetuses have the ancillary protections of their mother’s legal personhood.  But 
ex utero fetuses would not have these protections.  While parental property interests 
would function and may provide a basis for decision making and control, we may well 
need the additional identification of the developing ex utero fetus as a separate legal 
actor.  As artificial womb technology advances, this question should receive more 
thought and analysis.   
Id.   
24 Id. 
25 Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. 
26 §§ 2903.01-2903.08.   
27 Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: the Application of Property Theory to Embryos and 
Fetuses, 40 Wake FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005) [hereinafter Berg, Owning Persons]. 
28 HALDANE, supra note 15. 
29 Scientists Could Let a 100yo Give Birth, SUNDAY TERRITORIAN (Australia), Oct. 12, 
2008, at 44. 
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technology enabling more consistent and convenient reproduction is constantly being 
refined.30   
The earliest known proposal for an ectogenetic process comes from the 16th 
century occultist Paracelsus.31 Paracelsus’s formula involved creating a 
“homunculus” by sealing semen in the womb of a horse and allowing it to “putrefy 
for forty days” on a diet of human blood.32  The process’s success rate has never 
been documented, but seems dubious. 
The modern ectogenesis debate began during the 1920s in the arena of pulp 
science fiction magazines.33  The editors of magazines such as Amazing Stories often 
published the latest research of the time, and specifically tied their fiction into the 
current trends.34  The beginnings and early advances in the sciences of genetics and 
tissue culture spawned the earliest debates on reproductive technology, including 
cloning, genetic engineering, and ectogenesis.35  The term “ectogenesis” first appears 
in J.B.S. Haldane’s “Daedalus, or Science and the Future.”36  Haldane proposes 
                                                                 
30 See Anna Mulrine, Making Babies, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Sept. 19, 2004, 
available at http://health.usnews.com/usnews/health/articles/040927/27babies_2.htm (last 
visited: Feb. 15, 2009).  In 2004, over one billion dollars was spent on IVF (In Vitro 
Fertilization) therapy.  Id.  Reproductive therapy has been in the news again lately as a result 
of the octuplets born to Nadya Suleman on January 26, 2008.  Scott LaFee, Octopulet Case 
Sparks Calls for Fertility-Industry Curbs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 12, 2009, 
available at: http://www3.signonsandiego.com/stories/2009/feb/12/1n12births233821-
octuplet-case-sparks-calls-fertil/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).  Suleman’s are the second set of 
octuplets born in the United States, both through IVF therapy.  Id. With six prior children, also 
through IVF, and currently living on government assistance, Suleman has become a symbol of 
the need for regulation and oversight of fertility therapy in the United States.  Id. 
31 Scott Gelfand, Introduction, in ECTOGENESIS: ARTIFICIAL WOMB TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1, 3 (Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook eds., Rodopi 2006) 
[hereinafter GELFAND & SHOOK, ECTOGENESIS]. 
32 AUROLEUS PHILLIPUS THEOPHRASTUS BOMBASTUS VON HOHENHEIM, AKA PARACELSUS, 
Concerning the Nature of Things, in THE HERMETIC AND ALCHEMICAL WRITINGS OF 
PARACELSUS, VOL. 1, 124 (Arthur E. Waite ed., University Books 1967).  
33 See generally SUSAN MERRILL SQUIER, BABIES IN BOTTLES (Rutgers Univ. Press 1994) 
(providing a detailed history of ectogenesis in twentieth-century fiction).   
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 Scott LaFee, Will Artificial Wombs Mean the End of Pregnancy?, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Feb. 25, 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/science/20040 
225-9999-mz1c25womb.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).  The concept of ectogenesis has 
been given different names over the course of the near-century since it was introduced.  These 
include artificial uteruses, synthetic wombs, and uterine replicators.  For the purpose of this 
Article, I will refer primarily to “ectogenetic fetuses” and “fetuses developing 
ectogenetically,” as opposed to fetuses developing naturally, or in utero.  Any reference to 
other terms is a result of their use in source text.   Additionally, Haldane’s original use of 
“ectogenesis” predates the common usage of “genetics,” leading to possible confusion of the 
terms “ectogenetic” and “genetic.”  Despite similar terminology, ectogenesis has no 
relationship to genetics, and a fetus’s status as “ectogenetic” has no bearing on its genes or 
genetics as commonly defined.   
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eliminating pregnancy as a means of improving the human race eugenically through 
regulating reproduction.37 “Daedalus” is presented as a historical account of 
biological progress throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, tracing the 
biological innovations that lead to ectogenesis as standard practice.38  “As we know, 
ectogenesis is now universal, and in this country less than 30 per cent of children are 
now born of women.”39  While Haldane’s prediction of the end result of experiments 
in ectogenesis has not yet come to pass, many of his statements regarding yet-to-
occur milestones along the way have been eerily accurate.40   
One of Haldane’s predictions that did immediately occur was the vocal outcry in 
response to his proposal.41  Over the following six years, five essays were published 
in direct response to “Daedalus,” questioning Haldane’s proposals and the 
consequences of his predicted developments.42  The most famous product of those 
early ectogenesis debates is Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World.43  Juxtaposing the 
automation and mass-production principles of Henry Ford’s assembly line with his 
predictions for advances in biotechnology, Huxley presents a world in which people 
are grown to order, in batches of ninety-six, to fulfill specific roles.44  Specially 
tailored to fit the work assigned to them, Huxley’s humans are a chilling set of 
inhuman components engineered to fit a niche.45 This dehumanizing picture of 
                                                                 
37 HALDANE, supra note 15. 
38 Id. at 56. 
39 Id. at 65. 
40 SQUIER, supra note 33, at 71.   
Haldane’s fictional narrative is grounded in a fact . . . Although the other episodes in 
this developmental narrative are fictional extrapolations from the state of scientific 
knowledge in 1923, they anticipate real developments in reproductive technology 
leading up to and including the development of in vitro fertilization. . . Haldane’s story 
of the development of in vitro gestation parallels the actual story of the development 
of in vitro fertilization, as told in Dr. Robert Edwards’s autobiographical account.  
Both narratives move from successes in animal embryology to advances in human 
embryology. 
Id. 
41 HALDANE, supra note 15, at 49.  “The biological invention . . . tends to begin as a 
perversion and end as a ritual supported by unquestioned beliefs and prejudices.”  Id.  By 
describing a biological innovation as a “perversion,” then showing its commonplace 
acceptance, Haldane predicts a separation between sexuality and reproduction in modern 
society which did not yet exist.  SQUIER, supra note 33, at 70. 
42 SQUIER, supra note 33, at 66.  These essays established many of the issues still being 
discussed over eighty years later regarding ectogenesis.  The first, “Lysistrata, or Woman’s 
Future and Future Woman,” by Anthony Ludovici, predicts that artificial reproductive 
techniques will “defeminize” women and remove gender roles from society.  Id. at 75.  In 
“Hymen, or the Future of Marriage,” Norman Haire predicts that ectogenesis will enable a 
select few, specially screened, individuals to provide fertilized embryos for the entire human 
race, thus ensuring a superior species through eugenics.  Id. at 77.   
43 See generally HUXLEY, supra note 2. 
44 HUXLEY, supra note 2, at 1, 2. 
45 See generally HUXLEY, id.  
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ectogenesis warned a generation of the dangers of biotechnology, tabling the debate 
for over forty years.46 
Modern biotechnology is increasingly close to enabling extrauterine gestation.47  
On July 25, 1978, Louise Brown was born the first child of in-vitro fertilization 
(IVF), a process by which an egg is fertilized outside of the mother’s uterus and then 
implanted.48  On June 15, 1993, the United States Patent Office granted a patent for a 
placental chamber – artificial uterus.49 The proposed device is a “[l]ife support 
system for a premature baby in which the baby remains attached to its placenta 
through its umbilical cord,” and could support a fetus after as little as ten weeks of in 
utero gestation.50  In 1997, scientists kept fetal goats alive for the equivalent of one 
trimester in extrauterine incubators.51  In Australia, wobbegong sharks are 
undergoing experimental in-vitro gestation as part of a conservation effort for nurse 
sharks.52  Some experts place human trials of an artificial uterus as close as five years 
away.53 
For a process to qualify as complete ectogenesis, it must enable development of a 
fetus from fertilization to maturity, independent of the mother.54  However, partial 
ectogenesis, as an advancement of neonatal care, could enable an extremely 
premature fetus to grow to maturity independently of the mother.55  Current advances 
enable doctors to regularly deliver and develop children at twenty-four weeks of 
                                                                 
46 SQUIER, supra note 33. 
47 LaFee, supra note 36. 
48 Fergus Walsh, 30th Birthday for First IVF Baby, BBC NEWS, July 14, 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7505635.stm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). 
49 U.S. Patent No. 5,218,958 (filed Feb. 21, 1991).  
50 958 Patent, at [1].  Such a device would not enable complete ectogenesis because it 
would still require that the embryo spend the first ten weeks of development in utero.  
However, such a drastic decrease in the amount of time the embryo or fetus spends in a natural 
womb would still raise the same questions regarding viability and birth as a completely 
ectogenetic process.  See Son, supra note 18, at 215.  
51 Sakata et. al., supra note 7.  
52 Ben Cubby, New Womb to Nurse Species to Life, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sep. 16, 
2008, at 5, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/conservation/new-womb-to-nurse-
species-to-life/2008/09/15/1221330747960.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).  Wobbegong 
sharks, which are not endangered, are being used to test the artificial womb technology for its 
eventual use on nurse sharks, which are endangered, and whose young often eat each other in 
the womb. Id. Unlike most fish, sharks hatch their eggs inside their bodies, where they grow 
until they are large enough to survive outside the womb.  Id. 
53Nora Underwood, The Science of Motherhood, TORONTO STAR, May 10, 2008, at ID02 
available at http://www.parentcentral.ca/parent/newsfearures/article/423939 (last visited Aug 
25, 2009).  
54 HALDANE, supra note 15. 
55 Lafee, supra note 36.  See also ‘958 Patent, supra note 49. 
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gestation, and infants with as little as twenty weeks of development have been 
delivered with no long-term side effects.56   
Because ectogenesis is still a purely theoretical development, certain assumptions 
must be made regarding the future technology for the purposes of this Article.  In 
order to maintain a straightforward analysis, this paper will assume an ectogenetic 
method in which an egg is fertilized through IVF (in-vitro fertilization) and then 
placed into an artificial uterus for the entirety of its gestational period.  At the end of 
its development, the fetus is removed from the artificial uterus as a healthy infant, 
completely indistinguishable from a child gestated in utero.  A natural uterus is not 
required or involved during any point in this development.57 
Before delving into how the law should treat ectogenetic technology, the reasons 
for and against its use should be examined.  Some of the proposed reasons for 
undergoing ectogenesis include: allowing people (individuals or couples) who could 
not otherwise have a child without a surrogate to do so, eliminating the death of the 
fetus caused by abortion, and equalizing the reproductive labor between mother and 
father.58  Ectogenesis is most appealing as an alternative to surrogacy, without many 
of the potential problems involved in a surrogate pregnancy.59  Additionally, 
ectogenetic technology may allow for a fetus to be extracted from a pregnant mother 
without killing it, enabling abortion without termination.60  Ectogenesis has also been 
suggested as the key to sexual equality; because childcare responsibility has always 
been biologically linked to women, true equality will only occur once both sexes 
have an identical role in reproduction.61 
                                                                 
56 “Most-Premature Baby Allowed Home,” BBC News, Feb. 21, 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6384621.stm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). 
57 LaFee, supra note 36.  The absence of a natural uterus during any point of gestation is 
intended here for simplicity’s sake, and is by no means guaranteed.  Ectogenetic processes 
could enable a pregnant mother to have the fetus removed from her uterus at a specific point 
during pregnancy and placed into an artificial uterus to undergo the remainder of its 
development.  Many theorists and writers have raised the question of whether such a fetal 
extraction technique could, and should, be used in place of abortion, and whether a pregnant 
mother would have a right to an abortion if such a technique were available instead.  This 
particular question is beyond the scope of this Note, which will limit itself to fetuses created 
and developed entirely ectogenetically.  See generally Gelfand, supra note 31.   
58 Peter Singer and Deane Wells, Ectogenesis, in Gelfand & Shook, ECTOGENESIS, supra 
note 31, at 18.   Singer and Wells also suggest that ectogenesis, combined with genetic 
modification or cloning techniques, could be used to create custom-grown organs for 
transplantation.  It is notable that this suggestion was made in 1985, long before stem cell 
research or animal cloning technology.  
59 Id. at 11.  Such problems include poor health practices on the part of the surrogate 
mother, such as alcohol, tobacco, or drug consumption, lack of access to medical records, or a 
surrogate’s unwillingness to relinquish the child after birth.  See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 
(N.J. 1988).   
60 Singer and Wells, supra note 58, at 12. 
61 Id.  See also SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST 
REVOLUTION (William Morrow and Co., 1970). 
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Arguments against ectogenesis include the question of effects on mother or child, 
or both.62  Because children have always developed in utero, it is impossible to 
predict what effects removal from the uterus may have on a fetus.63  The same could 
be said of the effect on the mother; a possible bond formed during pregnancy might 
be eliminated.64  Finally, fears of embryo abuse, such as the potential for growing an 
embryo solely to harvest stem cells or organs from it, lead to a strong objection to 
any form of ectogenesis.65 
III.  CURRENT LAW 
Under the current law, the status of the unborn is largely undetermined.66  In Roe 
v. Wade,67 the Supreme Court established that the unborn are not persons per se, but 
that at some point during gestation, their interests become ‘compelling’ such that 
they are entitled to legal protection.68  This point was originally held to be the end of 
the second trimester, but was clarified in Planned Parenthood v. Casey69 to be 
‘viability’, the point “at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and 
nourishing a life outside the womb.”70  At that point, “the independent existence of 
the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that 
now overrides the rights of the woman.”71  Pursuant to that doctrine, a fetus is not 
entitled to protection until it is developed enough to survive outside the womb, albeit 
with aid.72  This viability standard has been semi-successfully attacked recently in 
Gonzalez v. Carhart,73 but not overturned.74  However, while pre-viable fetuses are 
                                                                 
62 Singer and Wells, supra note 58, at 16. 
63 Id.  
Suppose that we develop the technical ability to keep an embryo alive and growing 
outside its mother’s womb.  How could there be any guarantee that the subsequent 
child would develop normally?  Might there not be some thing, whether chemical or 
emotional, that is transmitted from the mother to her child during pregnancy and that 
we are unable to detect?  Without this element, mightn’t the child be permanently 
disadvantaged, physically or mentally? 
Id. 
64 Id.  See also Nancy Breeze, Who is Going to Rock the Petri Dish, in TEST-TUBE 
WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? (Ruth Arditti,et al. eds., 1984). 
65 Singer and Wells, supra note 58, at 18. 
66 Berg, Owning Persons, supra note 27, at 159. 
67 Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
68 Id. at 163. 
69 Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
70 Id. at 870. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 860 (acknowledging that medical advances might move the line at which a 
developing child is considered “viable”).  
73 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156 (holding that a ban on late-term, “partial-birth” abortions is 
Constitutional and does not overly threaten a woman’s right to an abortion, despite not 
distinguishing between pre- & post-viability abortions). 
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not considered people, they have been extended certain protections normally 
reserved for people, such as fetal homicide statutes.75  Courts have held defendants 
liable for injury to a pre-viable fetus, as long as it is eventually born alive.76   
The status of embryos is even less clear.77  In 1983, after the death of Mario and 
Elsa Rios, the probate court was forced to determine whether the two frozen embryos 
left by the couple were property to be inherited, or persons capable of inheriting the 
couple’s fortune.78  In 1986, Louisiana enacted a statute making embryos juridical 
persons and requiring them to be implanted.79  However, several states’ high courts 
have held that embryos are not persons, and that their progenitors’ rights in them are 
based in property or contract law.80   
In Davis v. Davis,81 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that embryos are neither 
persons nor property, but “occupy an interim category that entitles them to special 
respect because of their potential for human life.”82 Additionally, the Davis Court 
recognized that “the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of 
equal significance -- the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.”83 The 
negative right of procreation was determined to outweigh the affirmative one if 
another avenue exists for the child-seeking party to reproduce.84  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court also recognized the negative right of procreation nine years later in 
J.B v. M.B.85 
                                                          
74 Id. 
75 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 2903.01-2903.08 (2008).  
76 Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967); Kalafut v. Gruver, 389 
S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1990). 
77 Berg, Owning Persons, supra note 27, at 160. 
78 George P. Smith II, Australia’s Frozen ‘Orphan’ Embryos: A Medical, Legal, and 
Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27 (1985). 
79 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:121 -133 (2000). 
80 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174 (N.Y. 1988), Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 
(Wash. 2002). 
81 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
82 Id. at 597.  In Davis, an infertile couple had eggs extracted from the wife and fertilized 
with the husband’s sperm in vitro.  Id. at 591. After a failed implantation of one of the pre-
embryos, the remainder were frozen.  Following the couple’s divorce, the ex-wife initially 
wanted the pre-embryos implanted in her, but later asked that they be donated to childless 
couples.  Id. at 592. However, the ex-husband requested an injunction against the pre-embryos 
use, and eventually asked that they be destroyed.  He wished to prevent himself from 
becoming a genetic parent in a situation where he was not able to ensure the safety, security, 
and stability of the offspring in a two-parent household, and the Tennessee Supreme Court 
sided with him.  Id. at 590.  
83 Id. at 601. 
84 Id. at 604. 
85 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).  In J.B., a couple divorced after having already had one 
daughter via IVF.  Id. at 710. The husband, M.B., wished to donate the remaining frozen 
embryos to childless couples.  Id. at 710-11. The wife, J.B., wished to have them destroyed.  
Id. at 711. The court, in ordering the embryos destroyed, recognized the absence of a contract 
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In short, a fertilized embryo may be, but is not necessarily, considered a person 
before it is implanted in a womb.  Once it enters the womb, it may have some legal 
protection, but it is definitely not considered a “person.”86  When the fetus develops 
enough to have a “realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside 
the womb,” it is considered viable, and the State regains an interest in protecting it.87  
Finally, when the infant is born, it is recognized as a person and gains all of the legal 
protections entitled to a person and a citizen of the United States.88 
IV.  PROBLEMS WHEN ECTOGENESIS IS APPLIED TO THE CURRENT LAW 
The conflicts between modern abortion law, the legal status of fetuses and 
embryos, and developing technology will give rise to uncountable disputes regarding 
control over and interest in developing ectogenetic fetuses.  These questions include:  
1) whether either parent could choose to have an ectogenetic fetus terminated, 
and whether they would need the consent of the other parent, or the state, 
to do so. 
                                                          
for disposition between the two, as well as M.B.’s ability to father children at a later date.  
Citing Davis v. Davis, the court held that:  
M.B.'s right to procreate is not lost if he is denied an opportunity to use or donate the 
preembryos. M.B. is already a father and is able to become a father to additional 
children, whether through natural procreation or further in vitro fertilization. In 
contrast, J.B.'s right not to procreate may be lost through attempted use or through 
donation of the preembryos. Implantation, if successful, would result in the birth of 
her biological child and could have life-long emotional and psychological 
repercussions . . . Her fundamental right not to procreate is irrevocably extinguished if 
a surrogate mother bears J.B.'s child. We will not force J.B. to become a biological 
parent against her will. 
Id. at 717. 
86 Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 . 
87 Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870.  
88 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  While the status of embryos has been largely left 
unexamined in the United States, that is not necessarily the case elsewhere.  “In 1982, spurred 
by the birth four years earlier of the first ‘test-tube’ baby, the British government established 
the Warnock Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology.”  SQUIER, 
supra note 33, at 63.  The Warnock Committee ran a broad investigation into the future of 
reproductive technology, and in 1984, issued their recommendations to the government.  Id.  
After six years of debate, Parliament passed the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, 
whose chief provision was to limit experimentation on human embryos to fourteen days from 
fertilization.  Id.  While the provisions of the Bill may come from numerous sources, the 
Warnock Committee makes their feelings on ectogenesis clear: 
We appreciate why the possibility of such a technique arouses so much anxiety.  There 
are however two points to make about this.  First, such developments are well into the 
future, certainly beyond the time horizon within which this Inquiry feels it can predict.  
Secondly, our recommendation is that the growing of a human embryo in vitro beyond 
fourteen days should be a criminal offense. 
Id. at 64, quoting MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN 
FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, 71-72 (Basil Blackwell ed., Oxford Press) 1985.  
Ironically, the Report specifically disclaims predictive ability while advising the outlawing of 
a procedure it only predicts will exist.  SQUIER, supra note 33, at 63. 
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2) whether a child developed ectogenetically is considered “born,” and if so, 
when that birth takes place. 
3) whether a child developing ectogenetically is considered “viable,” under 
Roe, and if so, when it becomes so. 
A.  Termination Rights Over an Ectogenetic Fetus. 
If a couple were to undergo IVF and begin developing a baby ectogenetically, 
only to divorce later, there is a question as to whether either party could choose to 
have the fetus terminated, and whether it could be done against the express wishes of 
the other.89  Under current abortion law, a fetus can be terminated until the point that 
it becomes “viable outside the womb.”90  However, since ectogenesis causes the 
entirety of fetal development to take place outside the womb, there is never any point 
during development at which the ectogenetic fetus could be terminated.91  The 
current law vests the right to terminate a fetus entirely in the pregnant woman, whose 
choice is only weighed against the state’s interests, not those of any other 
individual.92  Conversely, the Davis Court recognized that a negative reproductive 
right (the right not to be a genetic parent) exists.93   This right can supersede an 
affirmative right, and is not limited to the mother.94 This right creates a strong 
foundation for the case that either parent should be allowed to terminate the 
ectogenetic fetus’ development, regardless of the other’s consent.95   
Furthermore, much of the rationale for abortion comes from the mother’s right to 
privacy and control of her own body.96  If the fetus is independent of the mother’s 
body, thereby removing the privacy factor from consideration of termination, the 
“State’s interests in protecting health and potential life” could outweigh the negative 
reproductive rights of either parents, or both.97  In other words, the State could be 
justified in forcing a parent to bring an ectogenetic fetus to term, while a fetus in 
                                                                 
89 See Christina L. Misner, What if Mary Sue Wanted an Abortion Instead? The Effect of 
Davis v. Davis on Abortion Rights, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 265 (1995).  Misner contrasts the 
central holding in Davis, freedom from unwanted reproduction, with the trends in abortion law 
restricting freedom to terminate, and advocates that abortion law should be based on the same 
negative right of genetic parentage as Davis.  Misner argues that “[t]here is something just a 
touch spooky here. As women's reproductive rights are contracting, men's rights seem to be 
expanding.”  Id. at 285.  But see J.B., 783 A.2d at 716 (recognizing a woman’s negative right 
of genetic parentage regarding frozen embryos).     
90 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
91 Berg, Elephants and Embryos, supra note 16, at 397. 
92 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.   
93 Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 588.  See also J.B., 783 A.2d at 717 (recognizing that a  woman’s 
right not to be a genetic parent warranted the destruction of her frozen embryos over the 
father’s objections when he was capable of fathering future children).    
94 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.  
95 Misner, supra note 89, at 299. 
96 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.  
97 Id. at 156.    
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utero at the same stage of development would still be subject to an abortion.98  No 
court has ever weighed State interests in fetal health and life against negative 
reproductive interests, rather than privacy in one’s own body, and such a balancing 
test might very well end by finding that the State interests dominate, thereby 
necessitating the fetus be brought to term.99  If this were to be the case, it would be 
necessary to determine who pays for the fetus’ development and is responsible for 
the child. 
B.  Birth and the Ectogenetic Fetus 
Next, ectogenesis will force a re-evaluation of the question of when a fetus 
becomes a person.100  The word “birth” is defined as “[t]he complete extrusion of a 
newborn baby from the mother's body.”101  Unfortunately, this definition falls short 
in two very important ways:   
                                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Misner, supra note 89, at 296-97.  
100 Berg, Elephants and Embryos, supra note 16, at 393. 
101 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 9.  
In a few jurisdictions, the state of the law may be changing. In South Carolina, for 
example, a child does not have to be born alive to be a victim of murder; a woman can 
be convicted of fetal murder if her baby is stillborn because of the mother's prenatal 
drug abuse.  
Id.  This brings up the interesting question of who is responsible for a developing ectogenetic 
fetus. Even before a fetus is viable, the state maintains an interest in protecting the life of the 
future child.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.  This interest is reflected in fetal homicide statutes and 
other laws designed to protect fetuses in utero from injury and death. See OHIO REV. CODE. 
ANN. §§ 2903.01-2903.08 (2008). Ensuring that a fetus developing ectogenetically is protected 
similarly should not be a very difficult task, but does present certain unique challenges that 
have not yet been addressed.  One such issue lies in the assignment of responsibility to 
caretakers of the ectogenetic fetus.  Traditionally, responsibility for a fetus in utero has been 
split between the pregnant mother, her neonatal physician, and outside factors (such as a 
tortfeasor to the fetus).  See Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40 
A.L.R.3d 1222 (2008).    However, ectogenesis will force a reevaluation of that responsibility, 
as the pregnant mother is no longer the sole and total conduit between the fetus and the outside 
world.  As a result, more, if not all, of the responsibility for the fetus’s care and well-being 
will fall on the attending physician and ectogenetic facility.   
Under the current law, pregnant mothers have been held criminally liable for danger and 
damage to their fetus during pregnancy, primarily as a result of drug use.   See e.g., BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9; see also James G. Hodge, Jr., Annotation, Prosecution of 
mother for prenatal substance abuse based on endangerment of or delivery of controlled 
substance to child, 70 A.L.R.5th 461 (2008).  Because an ectogenetic fetus is not linked 
through an umbilical cord to an individual the same way a fetus in utero is, it does not face the 
same danger of drug damage from its host.  However, it still may be subject to harm as a result 
of negligent or criminal conduct on the part of the caretaking facility, and lawmakers must 
recognize the responsibility such a facility takes when it agrees to shoulder the burden of care 
for an ectogenetic fetus.  Federal and state regulation will need to be enacted to ensure that 
ectogenetic care facilities take adequate precaution in caring for their charges, while at the 
same time recognizing that the technology will be experimental for a long time, with all of the 
unavoidable risks inherent in medical experimentation.  See generally Joyce M. Raskin and 
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1) The definition does not establish a level of development at which a baby is 
distinguished from a fetus, and the definition of fetus is unhelpful in that 
regard.102   
2) The definition only encompasses a baby that has been extruded from its 
mother.103   
If a baby is only distinguished from a fetus by its removal from the mother’s 
body, then any point at which a developing fetus is removed from the mother and 
placed into an artificial uterus could be considered as having constituted “birth.”104  
In this case, a fetus developing ectogenetically would be far more protected than one 
developing in utero, because it would be considered a fully-fledged, natural-born 
person from the moment of its removal.105  On the other hand, ectogenesis presents 
the possibility of developing a baby without having ever been inside the mother’s 
body.106  The current definition of birth would exclude such a child from having ever 
been born.107   
In this case, children developed ectogenetically would face several problems 
asserting themselves fully under the United States Constitution.  First, an argument 
could be made that no child of ectogenesis can be considered “natural-born,” thus 
removing them from qualification for President of the United States.108  However, all 
disputes over the term “natural-born” have arisen from whether it applies to someone 
born to American citizens abroad, and not due to process of birth itself.109  Second, 
and more importantly, the Constitution only recognizes persons “born or naturalized 
in the United States” as citizens.110  If a child of ectogenesis is considered born when 
it is removed from its mother, citizenship would be conferred on a still-developing 
fetus and thereby conflict with Roe.111  Therefore, there must be a point in fetal 
development, regardless of the medium, at which the child is considered legally born 
in order to qualify as a citizen.112 
                                                          
Nadav A. Mazor, The Artificial Womb and Human Subject Research, in Gelfand & Shook, 
ECTOGENESIS, supra note 31, at 160-181. 
102 “A developing but unborn mammal, especially in the latter stages of development.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
103 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9. 
104 Id. 
105 See Berg, Elephants and Embryos, supra note 16, at 398. 
106 See LaFee, supra note 36.   
107 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9. 
108 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.  “No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of 
the United States at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office 
of President.”  Id. 
109 Carl Hulse, McCain’s Canal Zone Birth Prompts Queries About Whether That Rules 
Him Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/us/ 
politics/28mccain.html. 
110 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
111 Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. 
112 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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C.  Viability and Ectogenesis 
One of the most pressing issues is to reconcile the legal protections available to a 
developing fetus regardless of the location in which it is developing.  It would be 
unfair to use two sets of rules for two fetuses at the exact same stage of development, 
simply because of the environment in which they are developing, without a sound 
legal reason for the difference.  Under the current law, a fetus developing in utero is 
not a person according to Roe,113 while an equally-developed ectogenetic fetus would 
either have been expelled from the womb, and hence born under the common 
definition, or never implanted, and thus possibly be a “juridical person” under 
statutory definition.114  It is far more consistent to draw a line in the developmental 
process of a fetus at which it is a person, regardless of the method of development, 
and entitled to all the rights and privileges thereof.115  The Casey Court attempted to 
draw such a line when they established “viability” as the point at which the State’s 
interest in preserving fetal life justifies banning an abortion.116  However, the 
definition used by the Court for “viable” failed to address whether technological aid 
constituted viability, although they did recognize that viability could be reached 
earlier through neonatal technological progress.117   
V.  WAYS TO ADAPT THE LAW TO ACCOMMODATE ECTOGENETIC TECHNOLOGY 
A.  Property Theory as Applies to Developing Fetuses 
The most important change necessary to reconciling ectogenetic advances with 
the current law is the application of property theory to embryos and fetuses.118 
Ectogenetic technology will allow for an unprecedented disconnect between a 
mother and her developing fetus, which must be recognized by firmly establishing 
the legal status of fetuses.119  The Supreme Court has already recognized certain 
personal rights in a pre-viable fetus, precluding the option of recognizing a 
developing fetus purely as property.120  However, the central holding of Roe still 
maintains that fetuses are not persons until they are born.121   
                                                                 
113 Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. 
114 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:121-133 (2009). 
115 Son, supra note 18, at 231.   
116 Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860.  Note that viability is not the only imaginable threshold for 
determining whether abortion is allowable.  Under French law, “virtually any pregnant woman 
can get a legal abortion during the first ten weeks of pregnancy.  All abortions must be 
preceded by a discussion between the woman and a counselor.”  LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: 
THE CLASH OF THE ABSOLUTES 73 (1992).  This fixed ten week standard is independent of the 
level of fetal development, and is instead meant to give the pregnant mother adequate time to 
consider her condition and make an informed decision.  Son, supra note 18 at 223.   
117 Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
118 Berg, Owning Persons, supra note 27. 
119 Son, supra note 18 (advocating the use of the Davis doctrine of the negative right to 
genetic parenthood in the Supreme Court’s consideration of the viability standard). 
120 See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 124. 
121 Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 . 
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 Recognizing a fetus as property, regardless of its form of development, would 
allow the courts to use an existing and long-standing body of law to settle disputes 
and allocate rights over both ectogenetic and in utero fetuses.122  This recognition 
would enable parents to create binding contracts with adopting parents and custodial 
physicians, as well as providing for disposition in the case of death or divorce.123  
Additionally, if ectogenetic technology were to allow a developing fetus to be 
removed from an injured or dying mother, treatment of the fetus as property would 
ease a court’s determination of its disposition.124 
Labor theory of property (the doctrine that one has a natural right to ownership 
over one’s own creations) also makes room for the special relationship between a 
fetus in utero and the pregnant mother.125 The labor and investment a pregnant 
mother makes in her child could be considered such a personal aspect of the creation 
of the child that it justifies maintaining the complete control over termination rights 
established in Roe, even in the face of competing property rights.126  The likely and 
logical decision, therefore, is that while all developing fetuses should be considered 
property, the unique strains and concerns placed on a woman during pregnancy 
create an interest in a naturally-developing fetus that supersedes both parents’ 
property interests, and both the affirmative and negative procreative rights of the 
father.127  This interest is strong enough to justify complete control by the mother, 
including the right to unilaterally terminate, over a fetus developing naturally, up 
until the point at which the fetus is considered legally viable.128  
B.  Parents’ Reproductive Rights 
The next question raised by ectogenesis is whether, if a fetus is developing 
ectogenetically, the father has the same interests and is entitled to the same control 
over it as the mother.129  The current view of abortion law is that a pregnant woman 
has both an affirmative and negative right to childbirth, neither of which can be 
                                                                 




126 Son, supra note 18. 
127 Misner, supra note 89.   
Davis fits nicely into the abortion context as a long-lost recognition of a woman's right 
not to procreate, upholding the proper level of heightened respect for women's rights 
to bodily privacy. The court in Davis was able to draw an equal framework of 
procreational rights simply because the other right implicated by abortion decisions - 
the right to control one's own body - was not at stake.  The object of debate was in a 
neutral petri dish. That is why the man's interest in Davis was given equal treatment. 
Otherwise, "a woman's stronger, competing interest in controlling her body" should 
overshadow procreational autonomy. Davis simply strengthens the importance of the 
right not to procreate. 
Id. at 297. 
128 Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.  
129 Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 588. 
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legally curtailed by anybody, including the father.130  “If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”131  However, the majority of the 
justification and rationale for this right stems from a woman’s right to control over 
her own body by preventing or aborting pregnancy.132  If a fetus is growing 
ectogenetically, independent of its mother’s body, then control over it must stem 
from her interest in it as a progenitor, which is equal to that of the father.133 
The Davis Court established that a person’s right to not be a genetic parent 
outweighs another person’s right to be one if another course of action is available. 134  
If the principle also applies to an ectogenetically developing fetus, then both parents 
have the same reproductive interests in the fetus and either one could choose to 
unilaterally terminate it.135  Ultimately, this would protect a naturally-developing 
fetus far more than an ectogenetically developing one.136  Under the current law, the 
right to terminate a fetus in utero lies entirely with the pregnant mother, whereas 
under the Davis negative reproductive right an ectogenetic fetus would be subject to 
termination from either parent without the consent of the other.137 
On the other hand, treating an ectogenetically developing fetus as property would 
be interpreted as requiring both parents’ consent before the fetus is terminated.138  
Under property theory, if both parents have equal interests in the fetus, one parent 
could relinquish his or her rights to it (such as in the case of divorce) by intent or 
                                                                 
130 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
131 Id. (emphasis in original).  
132 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852  
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical 
constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the 
beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in 
the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for 
the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for 
the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however 
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny 
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual 
imperatives and her place in society. 
Id. 
133 See Misner, supra note 89.   
[B]oth Davis and the abortion cases implicate the right to privacy as embodied in the 
right to procreational autonomy, which is unrelated to whether the egg is growing in 
the woman's body, or preserved in a petri dish. Potential life is potential life; the 
decision to become a parent resides with both parents, or at least with the mother 
contemplating abortion.   
Id. at 298. 
134 Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 601; see also Son, supra note 18. 
135 See Son, supra note 18. 
136 Id. 
137 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852; Davis 842 S.W.2d at 600. 
138 Berg, Owning Persons, supra note 27. 
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constructive abandonment, but not actively seek to destroy it without the other 
party’s consent.139  This requirement of mutual consent would protect an 
ectogenetically-developing fetus far more than a naturally-developing one, which 
under Roe can be terminated unilaterally by the mother.140  This solution would 
preserve the pregnant mother’s rights to terminate a fetus growing in utero, while 
requiring both parents’ consent to terminate an ectogenetic fetus. 
C.  “Birth” and “Viability” 
The next question is whether an ectogenetic fetus can be considered born, and if 
so, when that birth takes place.  For the purposes of the Constitution, a person must 
be born to be a citizen.141  If an embryo is created in vitro, then grown 
ectogenetically into an infant, a strong argument could be made that, having never 
been fully “extru[ded] from the mother’s body,” it was never born.142  In order to 
avoid this interpretation, states should statutorily recognize all fetuses that have 
reached legal viability as having been born, regardless of the method of their 
development.  Making “born” synonymous with “viable” will, in addition to 
protecting ectogenetic fetuses, eliminate the current gray area in reproductive rights 
between viability and birth, in which a fetus is protected by compelling state interests 
but is not yet a person.143  
Therefore, states must establish a point in fetal development at which the fetus is 
considered legally viable.144  Under Casey, viability was recognized at approximately 
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a period during fetal development at which a pre-viable fetus is not entitled to protection from 
termination but is entitled to protection regarding the method of termination.  Id. at 160.   
144 Son, supra note 18, at 215-16. 
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twenty-three to twenty-four weeks of development.145  However, Justice O’Connor 
underscored that recognition:  
The soundness or unsoundness of that constitutional judgment in no sense 
turns on whether viability occurs at approximately 28 weeks, as was usual 
at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at 
some moment even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as it may if fetal 
respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced in the future.146   
Justice O’Connor’s statement undermines an earlier assumption that “the threshold 
of fetal viability is, and will remain, no different from what it was at the time Roe 
was decided.”147  Ectogenesis will contradict that assumption by having a fetus that 
was created independently of the mother’s uterus.148 
There are three possible interpretations of viability that could be applied to an 
ectogenetic fetus, each with its own benefits and drawbacks.  The first is that, 
because an ectogenetic fetus exists independently of the mother from the moment of 
fertilization, it is viable throughout its entire development.149 This is a textualist 
interpretation of viability, because it adheres most closely to the holdings of both 
Roe and Casey in that a fetus is only a person once it is capable of meaningful life 
outside the womb.150  While the definition of “meaningful” might be bandied around, 
there is no question that ectogenesis would render a fetus capable of life outside the 
womb, independent of its mother.151  Recognizing this reality, the Court would have 
no choice but to recognize the ectogenetic fetus as an independent entity from the 
moment of fertilization.  
Under a second interpretation, the “naturalist approach,” a fetus is considered 
viable outside the womb only when it can survive without ectogenetic assistance.152  
This supports the underlying assumption of the Supreme Court in the Roe decision, 
that ectogenesis would not be a consideration in the near future and that a mostly-
developed fetus is close enough to being an infant as to warrant state protection.153  
The final interpretation of viability, the “advanced development approach,” views 
a fetus, both ectogenetic and in utero, as viable once it reaches a certain point in pre-
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natal development.154 This interpretation is the only definition of viability that gives 
equal standing to both in vitro and in utero development, recognizing that 
ectogenesis will render the terms “born,” “viable,” and even “abortion” functionally 
obsolete.  Using the definition above will allow parents155 to abort a developing 
ectogenetic fetus before it reaches the viability threshold, but still protect viable 
fetuses in accordance with the principles set forth in Roe and Casey.  The proper 
threshold of viability should be viewed in terms of advanced fetal development.156 
Currently, most physicians consider “viability” right now to be at approximately 
twenty-two weeks of development, but children have been born after as little as 
twenty weeks of gestation without long-term defects.157  Congressional hearings from 
expert witnesses in the fields of neonatal care and obstetrics are the fairest and most 
likely method of determining exactly where such a line should be drawn, and it is 
almost certain that both sides of the abortion debate will be present to make their 
opinions known. 
VI.  PROBLEMS ARISING FROM ADAPTING THE LAW TO ACCOMMODATE ECTOGENESIS 
A.  People or Property 
There are numerous and understandable objections to classifying developing 
fetuses as property.  First, deeming a human being at any stage of development as 
“property” could be an uncomfortable reminder of slavery in the United States.  
While no one plans on enslaving a developing fetus, the comparison is not entirely 
without merit.  The original precedent in which a person could also be property, 
Dred Scott v. Sandford,158 was overruled by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, prohibiting involuntary servitude and extending citizenship to all 
persons born in the United States.159 However, neither one explicitly prevents a 
human being from being considered property before birth.160 
Additionally, courts’ reticence in recognizing surrogacy agreements indicates a 
strong objection to any form of property-based outlook on human beings.161  While 
the relevant surrogacy cases have dealt exclusively with infants, rather than fetuses, 
some courts may consider the distinction trivial.  Furthermore, the different treatment 
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of surrogacy agreements from state to state leaves the question of interest in, and 
ownership of, an ectogenetic fetus uncertain.162 
Also, surrogacy cases provide a glimpse at the question of to whom an 
ectogenetic fetus may belong.  Surrogacy cases have recognized a birth mother’s 
parental interest in a child of different genetic parents,163 in spite of a contractual 
waiver.  While an ectogenetic fetus lacks a birth mother by definition, this 
recognition establishes the questionable validity of an interest in the child by 
someone other than the genetic parents.  In states where a surrogacy contract is held 
to be valid, a set of genetic parents could contractually transfer their parental interest 
to adoptive parents.164  However, in states where surrogacy contracts are considered 
void or voidable, a pair of genetic parents with no intent on raising a child could be 
forced into doing so by an adoptive parent who reneges on their contract, knowing 
that it might not be enforceable.   
However, the more likely problem with extending surrogacy contract invalidity 
to ectogenetic adoption arises when genetic parents arrange to have their fetus grown 
ectogenetically on behalf of a contracted adopter, but ultimately change their mind 
and decide to raise the child themselves.  This situation is where a property analysis 
can be helpful, even if not used exclusively, by weighing the traditional forms of 
property interests in the fetus, such as labor and investment, “title” (in this case, in 
the form of an adoption contract), and even “utility” (in the sense that one set of 
parents may provide a healthier upbringing, increasing the chances of the child 
becoming a productive member of society).   
B.  Changing the Definitions of Birth and Viability 
Reconciling birth with viability will require changing the law to recognize post-
viable fetuses as full persons, even while they are still in a natural or artificial 
womb.165  This may impact a mother’s medical options during late pregnancy, 
because the child will have the same rights and interests as the mother, whereas the 
present balance is between the mother’s interests and the future infant, not the 
current fetus.166  However, as many states already consider viable fetuses full persons 
for the purpose of civil and criminal liability, a change in the law regarding them is 
unlikely to effect significant change.167  On the other hand, tying the legal definition 
                                                                 
162 Id.  But see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding surrogacy contracts 
valid when the egg and sperm are donated by an individual other than the surrogate mother). 
163 Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1253. 
164 One additional question to consider is the idea of ectogenetic children whose adoptive 
parents are not parents at all but a state or corporate entity.  By eliminating pregnancy and 
childbirth, ectogenesis renders the concept of parenthood much more arbitrary.  If a surrogacy 
contract is valid between individuals, it stands to reason one would be equally valid between 
contracting genetic parents and a corporation.  See, generally, Robert A. Heinlein, FRIDAY 
(Del Rey 1983) (hypothesizing a corporate-owned “artificial person” genetically engineered, 
ectogenetically grown, and raised by a company).  
165 Berg, Elephants and Embryos, supra note 16 at 401. 
166 Id. 
167 See Hodge, supra note 101.  See also Berg, Elephants and Embryos, supra note 16, 
399-400. 
2010] NOT OF WOMAN BORN 165 
of birth into that of viability will require that the issue of viability be thoroughly 
settled.         
Questions arise from each of the above definitions of viability, each of which 
must be addressed before determining what protections are available to an 
ectogenetic fetus before it attains that status.  The most difficult problems arise under 
the textualist approach, wherein a fetus is considered viable, and hence protected 
from termination, once it is capable of life independent of the mother.168  Because 
ectogenesis allows independence from the mother at any time during fetal 
development, including fertilization, the textualist approach forces all ectogenetic 
embryos and fetuses to be protected by state interests from termination.169 This 
outcome would most likely please the “Right to Life” movement because it would 
eliminate the primary objection of the anti-abortion stance: the death of the fetus.170  
However, it would also have the most far-reaching ramifications on society and the 
law.171  If an ectogenetic fetus is a person, the question arises why a fetus in utero is 
not one, as well.172  A court could also find that ectogenetic fetuses are a protected 
class under the Equal Protection Clause.173 A key element to determining if a group 
is a suspect class, entitled to protection from discrimination, is whether its status 
stems from circumstances beyond their control.174  To a fetus, whose existence is 
dependent entirely on a mother or an artificial ectogenetic device, all circumstances 
would be beyond its control.  A court could therefore decide that equal protection 
does apply to fetuses, and that ectogenetic and in utero fetuses must have the same 
set of protections applied.  Therefore, all fetuses have a right to protection from 
termination.175  Establishing fetal rights from fertilization would be a complete 
reversal of Roe by establishing fetuses as persons, and could go so far as to require 
women to accept ectogenetic gestation in lieu of an abortion.176 Such a ruling would 
require the government to create, maintain, and regulate a system to maintain nearly 
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a million unwanted fetuses per year, not to mention finding caretakers for those 
children once they reach birth maturity.177 
The naturalist approach, in which a fetus is only viable once it reaches the point 
at which it can survive without ectogenetic technology, is too vague to be truly 
applicable.178  This approach maintains the spirit of Roe by allowing a parent to 
terminate a fetus before it can survive unassisted.179  However, both Roe and Casey 
account for the possibility that technology can push back the date of viability for a 
fetus.180  Furthermore, as ectogenetic research is primarily a refinement of existing 
neonatal respiratory and incubation technology, attempting to distinguish between 
ectogenetic technology and assistance for premature infants would be difficult and 
futile.181 
Finally, while the advanced development approach is the standard that best 
preserves the delicate balance established in Roe, establishing viability based on a 
specific point in fetal development is not without its problems.  First, the moment 
during gestation at which a fetus is considered “advanced” is difficult to pinpoint, 
and will require significant amounts of input from the medical community.182  Based 
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on current medical knowledge, “advanced development” is likely to have occurred 
between twenty and twenty-eight weeks after fertilization.183 
Second, and more importantly, the Supreme Court has already specifically 
overturned a specific point in development (the trimester system, established in 
Roe184) in favor of the broader “viability” test.185  Returning to the rigid 
developmental timeline established in Roe could be considered an erosion of 
abortion rights, especially after the recent upholding of the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban, which outlawed certain pre-viability abortions.186 
Even with the obstacles inherent in the advanced development interpretation of 
viability, it is the only one that allows for a reasonable compromise between state 
interests in ensuring that a developing fetus is born, and those of prospective parents 
who do not wish to become actual parents.187  Despite almost-certain objections from 
both sides of the abortion debate to such a compromise solution (pro-abortion 
activists opposing the return to a “bright-line” standard as opposed to “viability,” and 
anti-abortion activists opposing the right to voluntarily terminate an ectogenetically 
developing fetus), it is still the best way to maintain the rights and protections 
established in Roe and Casey.  This solution also recognizes and protects the 
negative reproductive rights espoused in Davis by preventing people from being 
forced into becoming unwilling genetic parents.188 
C.  Equal Treatment for Equal Levels of Development 
Once an ectogenetic fetus is determined to be viable, and thus constitutionally 
protected from termination, the law must still grapple with the inconsistencies 
between treatment of pre-viable ectogenetic fetuses and pre-viable fetuses in utero.  
The treatment of a pre-viable ectogenetic fetus as property, as described in the last 
section, must be reconciled with the legal limbo in which a pre-viable fetus in utero 
currently stands.189  Specifically, courts will need to determine whether the property 
law which would apply to ectogenetic fetuses and require both parents’ consent 
before terminating the fetus, would apply to those growing in utero as well.  If it 
does, then an in utero fetus would be considered as much the property of the father 
as of the mother, requiring his consent before termination.  This would undercut the 
unilateral right of a mother to have an abortion established in Roe.190   
Alternatively, a court could determine that the privacy and negative reproductive 
rights of a mother established in Roe for a fetus in utero apply to those growing 
ectogenetically.  Because a mother acting unilaterally can terminate a fetus growing 
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in her uterus, she should have that same right towards a fetus growing 
ectogenetically.  The court would then have to examine the protection of the 
ectogenetic fetus compared to the rights of the mother under a very different 
balancing test than courts have used up until now to evaluate abortion rights.  
Previously, courts have weighed the State’s interest in protecting nascent life against 
the mother’s interest in the privacy of her own body.191  In a debate over an 
ectogenetic fetus, the mother’s right to terminate would have to stem not from her 
control over her body, but from her right against being an unwilling progenitor.192   
This question strikes at one of the central issues of the abortion-rights debate, one 
which has been almost, but not entirely, purely academic until now: whether the right 
to an abortion comes from a woman’s right not to be pregnant, or her right not to be 
a mother.193  While no court has addressed this issue as it pertains to the abortion 
debate, the Davis holding supports a person’s right not to be an unwilling genetic 
parent.194  However, Davis only extends to embryos, over whose life no state has 
attempted to assert an interest in court.195  In order to truly determine the value of the 
negative reproductive right, it must be weighed not against a co-parent’s affirmative 
right, but against the state’s interest in nascent life.  If the negative reproductive right 
is recognized and found to outweigh the State’s interests in protecting nascent health, 
then a mother’s unilateral abortion rights expand to include an ectogenetic fetus.196   
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However, if the court decides that the State’s interests in protecting prenatal life 
outweigh the negative parental right, it would necessitate that an ectogenetic fetus 
could not be terminated.  This creates another situation in which a system would 
have to be established for caring for unwanted ectogenetic fetuses, requiring the 
State to either force the parents to maintain them and see to the eventual infant’s 
care, or to take responsibility for the fetuses itself. Alternatively, the State could 
create criteria under which an ectogenetic fetus is subject to termination, such as the 
onset of visible defects during development.197  If such a requirement were to be 
instituted, it would raise the legitimate question of why ectogenetic fetuses need a 
reason for termination, thus entitling them to heightened protection, while fetuses in 
utero are not.  Unless a reason for such protection could be found, this would once 
again create a scenario in which Roe is fully overturned in favor of the State’s 
interest in protecting prenatal life.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
There are no easy answers to the questions that will be raised by the advent of 
ectogenesis, but that does not mean they should not be asked before technology 
makes it necessary to answer them.  Advancements in neonatal technology are 
occurring at an alarming rate, and it is only a matter of years before Huxley’s vision 
of people without pregnancy becomes a real possibility.198 If we wait until 
ectogenetic technology is upon us before delving into its legal ramifications, we run 
the risk of a court or legislature making a snap decision that affects the reproductive 
rights of millions.   
The first necessary step is to establish a firm legal categorization of embryos and 
fetuses, based on their stage of development.199  Embryos and pre-viable fetuses must 
be acknowledged as property, even if some protections not normally granted to 
property are extended to them.200  Fetuses that have reached viability must be 
recognized as full persons and citizens, protected by the state.201  Eliminating this 
ambiguity will maintain a level of equality between fetuses developing 
ectogenetically and those in utero, without providing special treatment for one group 
or the other. 
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This categorization will solidify the rights of parents regarding a pre-viable 
ectogenetic fetus.  Recognizing such a fetus as property enables parents to share and 
maintain control equally over the ectogenetic fetus for the purposes of termination, 
transferability, and disposition.202  While this recognition establishes significant 
differences between each parent’s rights when dealing with an ectogenetic fetus as 
opposed to one in utero, these differences can be justified by the unique relationship 
between a pregnant mother and the fetus growing inside of her.  This relationship 
substantiates the pregnant mother’s sole right of termination found in Roe and Casey, 
while denying such unilateral authority in the case of an ectogenetic fetus, where her 
rights as a progenitor are on the same footing as those of the father.203 
The next necessary step is to remove the legal distinctions between viability and 
birth by recognizing any post-viable fetus as a person and having been born for legal 
purposes.  This will eliminate the gray area currently occupied by a viable unborn 
fetus, in which the government has a recognized interest in protecting it but it is not 
yet recognized as a person.  Acknowledging viable fetuses, regardless of their 
medium, as being people will keep the law consistent without causing any major 
changes in its application.204 
In order to recognize viable fetuses, however, it is necessary to clarify what it 
means to be ectogenetically viable.205  At least three possible interpretations of 
viability could be established, each with its own advantages and drawbacks.  A 
“textualist” interpretation adheres most closely to the definition set forth in Roe, 
under which a fetus is viable when it is capable of independence from its mother, 
regardless of its stage of development.206  Ectogenesis creates significant problems 
with this interpretation because it would render the fetus viable throughout its entire 
developmental cycle, making it a person from the moment of fertilization and 
unlawful to terminate at any stage.  A “naturalist” interpretation would recognize a 
fetus as viable once it is capable of life independent of both its mother and 
ectogenetic assistance.207  However, the vague nature of “ectogenetic assistance” as 
different from modern neonatal care is a largely semantic distinction, and would be 
difficult to clarify.208  Finally, an “advanced development” interpretation of viability 
recognizes a fetus as being viable once it has reached an advanced stage of growth, 
regardless of the environment in which it is growing.209  While several different 
points of growth could be recognized as “advanced,” the most reasonable benchmark 
to use would be sentience, at approximately twenty-two weeks of gestation.210  
Sentience would be the earliest point at which a fetus could feel pain or discomfort, 
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and thus have a legitimate interest in avoiding them.211  Recognizing advanced 
development and viability at sentience preserves the right to terminate established in 
Roe, and extends that right to the parents of an ectogenetic fetus.   
None of these suggested changes to the law should be undertaken lightly, as each 
carries foreseeable problems.  Careless understanding of the differences between 
ectogenetic fetuses and those in utero, or an overly broad definition of viability, 
could be used as justification for completely overturning the balance of rights 
between parent and fetus established in Roe.212  However, change to the way we 
make babies as a result of scientific breakthrough is inevitable, and the law must 
adapt to it.    
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